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At the heart of economic development and capital formation is the
transfer of resources from those who would save to those who would
invest. When the capacity to accomplish these transfers efficiently is
lacking, growth is impaired, and less profitable investments may dis-
place some that are more promising. In the United States, much of this
transfer of resources flows through a nexus of financial markets and
institutions. Banks, insurance companies, pension funds, savings and
loan associations, and other financial intermediaries fill an important
role in this financial system by offering savers an attractive means of
accumulating claims while offering investors attractive terms for accept-
ing claims. Without these intermediaries, each financial contract must
accommodate at once the specific, often incompatible motives of savers
and investors. For example, households seeking relatively liquid assets
or insurance coverage might find little common ground with businesses
seeking financing for factories. Consequently, the evolution of our
financial system is guided, to a great degree, by the opportunity for
profit which attracts enterprises that either would match savers with
investors of complementary interests or would mediate the distinct
interests of savers and investors, converting the primary securities
issued by investors into assets valued by savers.
The features of our financial system are shaped by public controls
and subsidies, as well as by the various motives of savers and investors.
Financial transactions allocate the risks as well as the returns of the
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underlying investments, not only among the parties to those transac-
tions but also among others. The design of these arrangements also may
either diminish or increase the total risk posed by uncertain investments
to the economy. Because of agency costs, externalities, and competitive
pressures, financial transactions may impose unacceptable risks on the
economy without offering adequate compensation. Accordingly, the
regulation of securities offerings, the conventions governing markets,
and the regulation of intermediaries may control the risks created by
these contracts. These regulations, by design, influence both the volume
of financial transactions and the means by which funds flow from savers
to investors.
The goal of policy is to foster contracts that allocate risks and returns
in an acceptable fashion without arbitrarily impeding the efficient
transfer of resources. In order to meet this goal, private and public
regulations must change with economic conditions as well as the
motives of savers and investors, so that the allocation of risks and
returns remains appropriate. Otherwise, the cost of these regulations
may exceed their benefits.
This paper concludes that the regulations governing financial inter-
mediaries promote debt financing by businesses. Savers are attracted to
the insured and guaranteed liabilities issued by intermediaries, who, in
turn, place these funds mainly in new debt securities. Although regu-
lations allow some intermediaries such as pension funds and insurance
companies to buy stock, these intermediaries tend to acquire the existing
equity of established corporations, not the newly issued equity of
developing enterprises. Regulations that restrict intermediaries from
holding equity may tend to make the economy less stable by dividing
the interests of investors from those of intermediaries and by encour-
aging intermediaries to hold riskier debt in order to earn a competitive
rate of return on their capital. Instead of emphasizing restrictions on
assets, often favoring debt over equity, regulators should rely on capital
controls by enforcing substantial minimum capital requirements, to be
financed by common stock.
While equity is inherently riskier than debt, public policy does not
necessarily promote financial security or economic stability by requiring
intermediaries to acquire debt rather than equity interests. With such an
emphasis on debt, the cost of equity financing may be relatively great
and relatively volatile, especially for developing enterprises that are not
well-known in capital markets. Furthermore, by dividing the interests of
investors from those of their "bankers," such restrictions encourage
intermediaries to supply less credit or seek premature repayment on
projects whose prospects appear to dim. Financial intermediaries exist
to bridge the differences between the motives of savers and those of
investors. When regulations sharpen the distinctions between theREGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 175
incentives of entrepreneurs and the incentives of those financing invest-
ments, economic activity and the prices of assets may become less stable
as opinions change about the future returns on investment projects.
The first section of this paper describes the role of banks, pension
funds, life insurance companies, and other intermediaries in transfer-
ring funds from savers to investors. During the past three decades,
households essentially have been exchanging equities for deposits,
insurance policies, or annuities. In this volume, Merton argues that
financial intermediaries can repackage debt and equity of firms to satisfy
investor demand. This may be prevented if financial intermediaries have
a limited capacity for acquiring equities, especially those of developing
enterprises. This change in the composition of households’ financial
wealth tends to diminish the supply and increase the relative cost of
equity financing.
The second section describes the risks created by financial interme-
diation. By reshaping rather than eliminating risks and by reducing the
rate of return on equity of regulated financial institutions, thereby
making them less competitive with unregulated enterprises, existing
regulations do not necessarily make financial intermediaries secure.
Furthermore, by insuring or guaranteeing the liabilities of qualifying
intermediaries or investors, the government tends to commit itself to
maintaining the values of many assets, thereby constraining the options
of macroeconomic policymakers.
The model in the third section describes the influence of regulations
on an intermediary’s behavior. Banks covered by deposit insurance are
encouraged to make loans with lower expected returns and greater
probabilities of default than they would otherwise. Binding capital
requirements can foster this disposition. To the degree that regulators
are not privy to the risks inherent in banks’ loans, restricting the types
of assets that banks can acquire may not reduce the risks that they bear
very substantially.
The Flow of Funds from Saving to Investment
In accumulating wealth, households forgo current consumption in
favor of increasing their opportunity for future consumption. This
saving comprises investing directly in capital goods (homes, plants,
durable equipment), acquiring the primary securities of others who
invest in capital goods (loans, commercial paper, bonds, stock), or
purchasing the indirect securities of intermediaries who, in turn, acquire
either primary securities (deposits, annuities, insurance policies) or
capital goods. While households directly control the disposition of much
of their saving, some is undertaken on their behalf by businesses and176 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
intermediaries that retain a portion of their earnings in order to finance
new investments.
Most of households’ saving each year is invested in capital goods.
Purchases of consumer durables and residences amount to about 20
percent of disposable income, while the acquisition of financial assets
has averaged just over 10 percent of income (table 1). Because those
households purchasing capital goods ordinarily finance their invest-
ments partly by tapping the savings of other households, net saving
amounted to just over 20 percent of disposable income during the last
four years, while net financial saving was only about 4 percent of
income. 1
The Composition of Financial Saving
In principle, both the volume of households’ saving and its alloca-
tion depend on the opportunities and services offered by the various
financial assets. Some assets are attractive because they are safe,
insured, or liquid; others appeal, despite their greater risks, because
they offer some chance of extraordinary returns; the stream of payments
offered by other assets coincides closely with the timing of future
expenditures anticipated by savers; still other assets offer insurance
against misfortunes; and, when "outsiders" do not understand fully
investors’ opportunities and motives, savers also value those financial
arrangements that encourage investors to divulge information or to
respect the interests of savers.
Although the acquisition of both primary and indirect assets has
been an important means of saving throughout our history, the compo-
sition of household portfolios has been shifting to favor indirect securi-
ties over primary securities (tables 1 and 2). Banks, insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, and other intermediaries have introduced
convenient products that, as surrogates for stocks and bonds, appar-
ently remove some of the hurdles that deter savers, as outsiders, from
financing investors. Altogether, the indirect securities issued by inter-
mediaries rose from approximately 20 percent of household financial
wealth earlier this century to about 50 percent today.
Since the 1950s, the subsidence of primary securities in households’
financial wealth has been due entirely to savers’ shifting their financial
assets from equity toward other securities. Equity in corporations and
partnerships formerly accounted for almost 60 percent of the portfolio;
1 This net financial sa~ing corresponds most closely, but is not identical to, the
concept of household saving in the national income and product accounts.Table 1
Composition of Household Saving
1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-
1900 1912 1922 1929 59 64 69 74 79 84 88
Percent of Disposable Income:
Gross Purchases of Real Assets
and Financial Assets 19.4 20.6 24.1 25.6 29.6 28.9 29.5 30.9 33.9 30.9 32.9
Gross Purchases of Real Assets 10.0 10.8 15.6 15.6 20.4 18.6 18,4 18.2 19.6 17.5 19.8
Purchases of Financial Assets 9.3 9.8 8.5 9.9 9.2 10.3 11.0 12.7 14.2 13.4 13.1
Percent of Purchases of Financial Assets:
Primary Securities 69.5 78.2 48.2 107.5 21.9 9.9 18.8 -2.0 1.0 -3.0 5.1
Equity 50.2 46.0 55.3 75.8 -1.0 -2.5 -7.4 -10.5 -20.5 -32.5 -27.5
Corporate Equity 19,7 28.4 26.3 57.9 3.9 -1.9 -5.6 -1.9 -6.7 -9.5 -23.9
Noncorporate Equity 30.5 17.6 29.0 17.8 -5.9 -1.6 -3.3 -7.0 -15.7 -25.5 -18.3
Debt Securities 19.3 32.2 -7.1 31.7 23.9 13.4 27.7 6.9 23.5 32.0 47.3
U,S. Government Securities -3.4 .1 -45.6 -4.5 5.6 1.6 10.0 -1.9 11.2 17.5 22.6
Indirect Securities 30.5 21.8 51.8 -7.5 76.8 88.7 78.7 99.5 96.0 100.5 88.8
Deposits 21.2 16.0 39.2 -18.3 42.3 55.9 47.3 66.0 55.9 54.3 37.7
Pension Fund Reserves 0 0 .2 -1.6 23.6 23.4 23.4 27.4 35.3 43.5 46.9
Life Insurance Reserves 9.3 5.8 12.4 12,5 10.9 9.4 7.9 6.2 4.8 2.7 4.2
Percent of Disposable Income:
Increase in Liabilities 1.7 1.4 3.1 1.9 5.5 5.7 5.2 5.9 8.6 6.6 9.2
Notes: For tables 1 and 2, real assets include residential structures, consumer durables, and nonprofit plant and equipment. Corporate equities include all corporate
equities held directly by households and equities held indirectly in mutual funds. Debt securities include U.S. Government securities, tax-axempt obligations, open market
paper, mor[gages, corporate bonds, and securities credit held directly by households as well as credit market instruments held indirectly through mutual funds or money
market mutual funds. Deposits include all checking, savings, and time deposits held directly by households as well as credit market instruments held indirectly through
mutual funds or money market mutual funds.
Source: Disposable income 1900 to 1929, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 139. All other data 1900 to 1929, Raymond W.
Goldsmith, 1956. A Study of Saving in the United States, vol. I, p. 365. All data 1955 to 1988, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.Table 2
Composition of Household Assets
1955- 1960- 1965-- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-
1900 1912 1922 1929 59 64 69 74 79 84 88
Percent of Total Assets:
Real Assets                   48.5 41.4 40.7 36.6 31.2 30.0 29.7 33.4 37.4 36.5 34.8
Financial Assets 51.5 58.6 59.3 63.4 68.8 70.0 70.3 66.6 62.6 63.5 65.2
Percent of Financial Assets:
Primary Securities 80.9 78.9 76.1 77.7 69.9 67.4 64.8 59.3 55.4 56.1 52.4
Equity 54.4 55.6 49.3 58.6 58.5 57.1 55.4 50.2 46.2 45,7 40.2
Corporate Equity 33.7 42.4 34,8 48.4 27,9 30.8 32.2 25.4 16.4 16.3 17.4
Noncorporate Equity 20.8 13.2 14.5 10.2 30.4 26.1 23.0 24.5 29.6 29.1 20.9
Debt Securities 26.4 23.3 26,8 19.2 11.5 10.5 9.7 9.4 9.4 10.7 14.1
U.S. Government Securities 1.8 .6 6.2 1.4 6.3 4.9 4.2 3.5 3.7 5.0 7,0
Indirect Securities 18.8 20.2 21.4 19,1 29.1 31.6 34.2 39.6 43.4 42.8 46.1
Deposits 14.4 15,0 16.3 12.9 17.0 18.4 20.3 24.0 26.1 24.1 23.8
Pension Fund Reserves 0 0 .2 .7 5.6 7,3 8.6 10.6 13.1 15,6 19.7
Life Insurance Reserves 4.3 5.2 4.9 5.6 6.5 6.0 5.3 5.0 4.2 3.1 2.6
Percent of Total Assets:
Total Liabilities
Source and Notes: See table 1.
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today its share is approximately 40 percent. Even though equities
represent the single most important asset in households’ financial
wealth, these securities, which tend to be held by a very few of the most
wealthy households, have played a relatively modest role in transferring
resources from savers at large to investors. Instead, equity generally
represents the cumulative value of investors’ retained earnings in their
own enterprises.
Of the remaining financial assets, bank deposits, pension fund
obligations, primary debt securities (mostly government debt), and the
obligations of life insurance companies occupy the largest share of
households’ wealth. Bank deposits (comprising the accounts of commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions) are held by most households, repre-
senting the broadest source of new funds for investors. Although these
deposits have accounted for an increasing share of households’ financial
wealth, they are not growing as quickly as the reserves of pension funds
(comprising the reserves of private pension plans and state and local
government retirement funds), the third largest component of wealth.
Because many employers and households participate in pension plans,
these intermediaries also represent a broad source of funds for inves-
tors. Life insurance reserves today account for only 3 percent of
households’ financial assets, less than one-half their share of the 1950s.
The Composition of Financing for Investors
Businesses may finance their investments either with internal funds
(retained earnings), which are equity, or with external funds, which
may be either equity or debt. Since the 1950s, external funds have
provided at least 60 percent’of the financing of nonfinancial corporations
(table 3), and, following a familiar historical pattern, debt accounted for
more than 85 percent of this external funding.2 After deducting capital
consumption from equity, debt accounted for almost 60 percent of the
financing of net investment by nonfinancial corporations from the 1950s
to the 1980s.
The relative stability of corporations’ ratio of debt to assets, com-
pared to the substantial volatility in their sources of funding, suggests
2 Goldsmith 1955, 1973; Navin and Sears 1955; Taggart 1986; Baskin 1988; Kopcke
1989b. Although these figures suggest that nonfinancial corporations relied on equity
financing more during the first 30 years of this century than they have subsequently, these
estimates probably overstate the contribution of new equity issues. Flow of funds accounts
include the initial public offerings of established proprietorships and partnerships that
convert to corporations. Such conversions were more significant during the early twenti-
eth century than they have been since 1940. Furthermore, before 1930, much of the new
equity was issued by one corporation to acquire the outstanding equity of another, the
value of which is not subtracted from new equity issues in Goldsmith’s data.Table 3
Financing of Nonfinancial Corporate Business
1901- 1913- 1923- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-
12 22 29 59 64 69 74 79 84 88
Percent of Total Sources of Funds:
Net Equity Financing 53.7 56.7 58.1 47.7 48.9 41.6 31.7 39.7 25.3 -6.5
Debt Financing 46.3 43.3 41.9 52.3 51.1 58.4 68.3 60.3 74.7 106.5
External Financing 45.0 40.0 45.0 60.6 54.3 60.6 77.9 64.8 73.3 59.9
Percent of External Financing:
Equity Issues                   31.1 27.5 42.2 14.1 5.6 3.5 12,7 8.7 -3.4 -78.7
Debt Issues 68.9 72.5 57.8 85.9 94.4 96.5 87.3 91.3 103.4 178.7
Percent of Total Assets:
Real Assets 63.7 63.5 58.4 73.2 71.8 71.1 71.6 74.6 74.6 72.4
Financial Assets 36.3 36.5 41.6 26.8 28.2 28.9 28.4 25.4 25.4 27.6
Equity Financing 50.0 59.2 59.4 65.9 63.1 59.5 59.9 66.5 67.3 60.3
Debt Financing 50.0 40.8 40.6 34.1 36.9 40.5 40.1 33.5 32.7 39.7
Percent of Debt Financing:
Credit Market Instruments 63.1 49.1 54.2 62.2 64.6 64.3 66.0 69.4 64.9 68.0
Note: Balance sheet items for 1900 through 1929 are for the end year of each period rather than a period average.
Source: Data for 1900 to 1929, Raymond W. Goldsmith, 1973, Institutional Investors and Corporate Stock--A Background Study, p. 42. Data for 1955 to 1988, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.REGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 181
that corporations choose their financing in order to manage their degree
of leverage.3 If, at any time, one blend of debt and equity financing is
preferable to others and if this optimal blend varies with the cost of
obtaining debt versus equity financing, then the terms under which
financial intermediaries obtain funds and the terms under which they
are willing or able to advance funds will influence both the choice of
leverage by businesses and their rate of investment (Gurley and Shaw
1955, 1956, 1960; Brainard and Tobin 1968; Tobin 1969, 1982).
Because intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies, and
pension funds, occupy an increasingly important role in supplying
businesses with external funds, their willingness or ability to supply
equity versus debt financing influences the financial structures of
businesses and their cost of capital. While most intermediaries acquire
considerable amounts of debt (tables 4 and 5), few hold significant
amounts of equity (tables 4 and 6). Most intermediaries, including the
important banking enterprises, by regulation or custom essentially hold
no equity other than that of their related enterprises. Insurance compa-
nies and the rapidly growing pension funds together have obtained
their equity on secondary markets from households, which have been
liquidating their positions since the 1950s (table 1). Accordingly, the
acquisition of equity by insurers and pension funds seldom supplies
new financing directly to corporations.4
Because the major source of new equity financing for businesses has
been retained earnings, many rapidly growing firms that are not
well-known in capital markets often turn to other "nonfinancial" cor-
porations for funds, frequently leading to mergers and acquisitions.
Moreover, trade credit extended by nonfinancial corporations (not
including consumer credit or loans by subsidiary finance companies) in
1988 amounted to 10 percent of their total assets or almost 40 percent of
their financial assets.5 The financial office of a business that can obtain
ample financing at favorable terms is itself a potential financial interme-
diary.
3 Although the Modigliani-Miller theorem and some of its refinements suggest that
leverage may be immaterial for a corporation (Taggart 1985), when capital markets are not
perfect or returns are diminishing, the choice of leverage may become important (Navin
and Sears 1955; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Baskin 1988; Kopcke 1989a, 1989b).
4 Stock markets provide shareholders a convenient means of liquidating their stakes.
This opportunity may indirectly finance capital formation by encouraging entrepreneurs
or venture capitalists to invest in growing enterprises. This pattern of financing depends
on the motives and regulations governing investors as well as those influencing interme-
diaries and savers (see footnote 3).
s The trade credit reported as a liability of nonfinancial corporations in 1988 was about
one-fifth of total liabilities (other than equity), an amount that exceeded bank loans to
these corporations and which equaled six-tenths of the face value of corporate bonds.Table 4
Composition of Assets of Financial Intermediaries
Percent of Total Assets
1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985 -



























18.5 13.0 13.8 7.7 8.0 7.9 8.1 7.4 7.1 6.2
1.3 1.1 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94.7 91.7 88.8 86.7 88.5 89.3 86.7 84.6 83.0 81.9
24.8 34.4 47.1 7.7 7.5 8.1 6.6 5.9 4.6 4.8
.8 .5 .4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 .7 .3 .4
97.2 97.1 96.2 93.0 92.3 92.1 92.1 91.8 89.0 87.7
0 20.0 20.0 24.0 33.9 41.7 47.1 40.2 39.6 43,6
0 80.0 80.0 73.5 63.6 54.9 47,8 50.4 52.7 51.2
12.0 8.2 7.6 12.0 12.8 13.3 12.5 11.5 10.9 9.5
2.2 .6 2.4 3.8 4.8 6.2 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.4
89.2 91.5 89.8 90.2 88.6 87.0 82.9 81.8 80.0 79.7
39.8 29.4 30.2 40.6 41.8 36.7 31.6 25.2 25.7 24.7
19.5 12.3 21.4 27.6 30.3 30.9 26.5 16.1 18.7 17.6
59.6 73.7 66.5 71.7 69.3 68.2 71.6 82.3 79.9 81.5
0 62.7 73.3 87.3 86.2 84.0 58.2 58.1 57.1 33.4
0 34.5 24.0 12.7 12.4 13.6 34.8 35.3 35.3 48.8
30.0 29,0 28.9 2.4 3.7 5.6 10.0 16.7 15.0 18.0
10.0 7.2 8.6 11.8 5,6 11.0 12.0 8.0 7.4 8.4
90.0 92.8 91.4 88.2 94.4 89.0 88.0 84.1 78.4 72.5Distribution of Assets among Financial Institutions
Percent of Total Assets of Financial Institutions
Commercial Banking 63.6 65.4 65.5 54.0 44.2 39.8 39.9 41.6 39.8 36.9 33.4
Thrifts 18.6 14.9 13.0 14.3 16.5 19,3 19,3 19.7 21.5 19.4 18.3
Pension Funds 0 0 .1 .4 7.6 10.0 11.6 12.4 14.3 16.4 16.8
Life Insurance Companies 11.1 13,2 12,0 14.4 19,7 17,8 15.6 13.2 11.9 11.4 11.3
Investment Trusts 0 0 .2 2.5 2.1 3.1 3.9 3.4 2.0 1.9 5.7
Finance Companies 0 0 0 2.0 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8
Other Insurance
Companies 3.3 3.5 4.4 6.2 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.5
Money Market Mutual
Funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 3.4 3.4
Security Brokers and
Dealers 3.5 3,0 4.8 6.3 1,1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.8
Notes: In calculating capital-asset ratios, data on real assets for commercial banks from 1984 to 1988 are for FDIC-insured banks only. Thrifts includes savings and loans,
mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Credit unions are included in the capitaPasset ratio only from 1972 to 1988. Investment trusts includes REITs, CMOs, and mutual
funds. All data for 1900 to 1929 are from Raymond W, Goldsmith, 1958, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900. Data on total assets for banks
are from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Reports, and Statistics on Banking. Data on total assets for life insurance companies are from the American
Council on Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact Book. Data on total assets for other insurance companies are from Best’s Aggregates and Averages for the
Property-Casualty Insurance Industry. Data on total assets for savings and loan companies are from the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation, unpublished data, Data
on total assets for credit unions are from the National Credit Union Administration, unpublished data. Data on total assets for REITs are from the National Association of
Real Estate Investment Trusts, unpublished data, All other data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.Table 5
Holders of Equity
Percent
1900 1912 1922 1929 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970--74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-88
Households 96.8 97.8 97.9 96.1 91.4 88.4 85.4 79.2 73.5 72.0 68.3
Pension Funds 0 0 0 ,1 2.6 4.7 6.7 11.5 17.1 19.0 20.8
Investment Trusts 0 0 .1 1,4 2.6 3.7 4.5 4.4 3.4 3.1 5.2
Life Insurance Companies .5 .3 .1 .2 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.5 3.4 3.1 3.0
Other Insurance Companies 1.0 .7 .6 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.1
Banking 1.2 1.0 .9 .8 .3 .3 .3 .4 .5 .2 .2
Source: Data for 1900 to 1929, Raymond W. Goldsmith, 1956, A Study of Saving in the United States, pp. 61-91. Data for 1955 to 1988, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds.
Table 6
Holders of Debt of Nonfinancial Sector
Percent
1900 1912 1922 1929 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-88
Banking 30.5 35.0 32.4 31.8 39.6 42.3 43.1 45.8 46.8 42.5 39.9
Households 35.6 35.6 39.2 35.8 20.0 17.8 15.1 13.0 11.9 12.0 12.5
Business 27.1 20.1 18.7 17.5 16.5 15.1 14.3 14.3 12.9 12.8 11.0
Life Insurance 4.4 6.8 5.8 7.9 13.7 13.0 11.3 9.5 8.5 8.0 8.2
Federal Government n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a, 4.2 4.9 6.0 7.1 7.7
Pension Funds 0 0 0 ,2 4.2 5.1 5.2 4.9 5.7 6.8 6.9
Finance Companies 0 0 0 1.1 2.9 3,4 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.4
Investment Trusts 0 0 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .8 .8 2.7 5.1
Other Insurance Companies .9 1.2 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.1
Notes: Banking includes commercial banks, savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Business includes corporate and noncorporate business.
Investment trusts includes CMOs, REITs, mutual funds, and money market mutual funds.
Source: Data for 1900 to 1929, Raymond W. Goldsmith, 1956, A Study of Savings in the United States, pp. 61-91. Data for 1955 to 1988, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds. Data on federal debt holdings, Office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis: Budget of the U.S. Government.REGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 185
The federal government also is a financial intermediary. Aside from
offering considerable health and retirement benefits to households,
which pay "premiums" in the form of payroll taxes, the government
and its sponsored enterprises hold almost 8 percent of the debt issued
by nonfinancial sectors (table 6), while guaranteeing the outstanding
balance on another 6 percent of the debt issued by households and
businesses. Altogether, the government directly or indirectly insures
about one-half of the debt of households and businesses through these
loans, guarantees, and the insuring of bank deposits and pension plan
obligations.
Risk and Regulation
A bank may offer deposits with little risk by running a "matched
book": the characteristics of deposits are matched closely with those of
assets. If intermediaries did little more than run matched-book mutual
funds, then the economy would have advanced little beyond the stage
where savers seeking liquid deposits and insurance found little in
common with investors wanting to finance new factories. For most
savers, the appeal of indirect securities issued by intermediaries is
greater than that of primary securities, partly because intermediaries
bear risks by transforming the properties of primary securities into those
more attractive to savers. Financial intermediaries also serve savers and
investors by evaluating investors’ prospects, monitoring their perfor-
mance, and providing them a relatively dependable access to funds on
terms commensurate with their risk and returns.6
Deviating from a matched book creates risk. But, in doing so,
intermediaries might increase their return on assets, the yields they offer
depositors, and their profits; they also might offer funds to investors on
better terms than otherwise possible. To a degree, a good reputation, a
secure money market, and some ability to sell assets mitigate the risk of
an unbalanced book, but the system as a whole is vulnerable should the
motives of savers not match those of investors very closely (Keynes
1936; Minsky 1985). Intermediaries bear a considerable risk of insolvency
or eventual illiquidity, for example, to the degree the redemption values
of their liabilities do not match those of their assets.7 Most households’
6 See Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1956, 1960); Jensen and Meckling (1976): Leland and
Pyle (1977); Smith and Warner (1979); Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Diamond (1984); Fama
(1985); Bernanke and Gertler (1987); Gertler (1988); and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1989).
7 During the late 1970s and 1980s, savings and loan associations gradually became
illiquid and insolvent, even though the book value of their assets exceeded their liabilities186 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
financial assets are of "guaranteed" principal, while the value of capital
goods is never "guaranteed.’’s
Risks Inherent in Intermediation
By bearing the risk of a mismatched book, financial intermediaries
essentially reduce the difference between the price savers ask and the
price investors bid for financial resources. As long as intermediaries
fully recognize the consequences of this risk, their activities may
facilitate efficient capital formation. But intermediaries may not bear the
full risk inherent in their activities for at least three reasons. First,
because of agency costs, the owners and managers of intermediaries
have an incentive to acquire relatively risky assets and to finance their
assets with relatively little of their own equity. Second, some of the risk
created by intermediaries is borne by the economy at large. Third,
intermediaries may be prone to "winner’s curses."
The owners of any enterprise financed partly by "debt" (defined
claims as opposed to the residual claims of equity) have an incentive to
promote the value of their own interests at the expense of customers and
creditors by making relatively risky investments or relying on relatively
little equity financing (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Galai and Masulis
1976). This potential agency cost becomes especially great when credi-
tors lack sufficient information about the characteristics of the enter-
prise’s assets. Consequently, this cost may be considerable for interme-
diaries that exist partly because of savers’ unfamiliarity with investors’
offerings. To the degree intermediaries are willing to accept relatively
risky assets, they, in turn, will tolerate greater leverage on the part of
investors to whom they offer financing.
When intermediaries, especially depository institutions, encounter
hardships, they may trigger panics, runs, or withdrawals, which can
threaten customers of other intermediaries with capital losses and retard
economic development (Bernanke 1983; Calomiris and Hubbard 1989;
Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Gertler 1988). Each financial intermediary
ordinarily considers only the risks and returns borne by the parties to its
for much of this time, because the characteristics of their liabilities did not match those of
their assets. They borrowed short while lending long, and the value of the real estate
backing their deposits collapsed. The risk of illiquidity or insolvency arises whenever
changes in yields or relative prices influence assets differently from liabilities.
s In 1988, the tangible assets of households and nonfinancial corporations, which back
their financial assets, were about $11 trillion. Land and structures represented more than
one-half of this sum. Much of the remainder was durable equipment whose gross returns
would "liquidate" its value only over several years. On the other hand, most of the
financial assets that ultimately finance these tangible assets are deposits, short-term
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contracts, instead of those borne by the entire economy. Consequently,
some activities that pose high but acceptable risks for the intermediary
and its customers may pose unacceptably great risks for society.
Finally, a winner’s curse may tempt intermediaries to commit too
many funds to the latest fad, paying relatively high prices for risky
assets. As a consequence of the laws of probability and familiar waves in
the pattern of economic development, at any time some assets will boast
a recent record of consistently high returns with little apparent risk.
Intermediaries holding these assets are more profitable than their
competition. An overly optimistic assessment of the opportunities
offered by these assets coupled with the desire to remain competitive
and to appear in step with current opportunities can encourage many
intermediaries (as well as savers and investors) to bid too aggressively
for these assets, perhaps accepting too great a degree of leverage borne
by investors (Keynes 1936; Thaler 1988). Ultimately, intermediaries can
pay an excessive price, thereby accepting an inadequate return, given
the risks inherent in these assets.
Deposit Insurance
Society may control the risk of runs by insuring bank deposits,
annuities, or pension plans, but doing so increases the agency costs of
intermediation. Although these agency costs are present even without
insurance, such guarantees make savers less critical and reduce the cost
of an intermediary’s reliance on debt financing. These guarantees, for the
same reasons, also may increase the degree of intermediation, reduce the
cost of capital, and increase savers’ acquisition of debt instruments.
Deposit insurance may be either explicit or implicit. Qualified
accounts in banks and many pension plans are insured by government
agencies to which these intermediaries (and their customers) may pay a
fee. Because the reserves backing this insurance are modest and many of
the large deposits upon which most of the more prominent banks
depend are uninsured, much of the confidence in banks, pension funds,
and other intermediaries derives from an implicit guarantee by the federal
government to maintain a stable financial system. The importance of this
implicit insurance may be so great that banks and pension funds, the only
intermediaries favored with explicit insurance, may be the only intermedi-
aries that must pay for their insurance (Wojnilower 1989).9
9 The scope of explicit insurance extends beyond financial intermediaries under these
circumstances. The support of "policy" extends through the money market--government
securities, repurchase agreements, federal funds, commercial paper (Penn Central)--to
the credit market--mortgage participations and passthroughs, small business loans, farm188 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
Whether insurance is explicit or implicit, this guarantee creates a
"put" written by the government in favor of financial intermediaries,
their "depositors," and their borrowers. A commitment to financial
stability for the sake of long-term economic development entails a
commitment to a relatively smooth course of GNP, incomes, and
therefore asset values, breeding financial contracts, institutions, and
conventions that presume such stability. Unless insurance is limited or
regulations can restrain financial arrangements, financial instruments,
under some circumstances, may become more dependent on such
stability through, for example, greater leverage, the willingness to rely
on the projected values of more assets as collateral, the design of
contracts, and the embedding of shrinking variances in asset pricing.
This put can harm economic development. If the government is to
ratify asset prices, its policy, to a degree, must enforce investors’
expectations (Keynes 1936; Minsky 1985). Whenever the government,
because of social externalities or changes in circumstances, would be
inclined to pursue policies that would depress the prices of assets, the
commitment or need to maintain a sufficient degree of financial stability
¯ may limit the latitude of policymakers (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City 1986). When financial contracts are less dependent on this commit-
ment, policymakers may have more discretion.
Capital and Credit Controls
The agency costs associated with financial intermediation may be
reduced by capital and credit controls. Capital controls limit the degree
to which intermediaries may reduce their reliance on equity financing.
Credit controls restrict an intermediary’s choice of assets in order to limit
the risk they might assume. If these controls are binding, they also tend
to limit intermediation and raise the overall cost of capital for investors.~0
Credit controls, to the degree they require or encourage intermediaries
to acquire debt rather than equity, tend to foster investors’ reliance on
debt financing.
Binding credit controls expose intermediaries to competition from
other enterprises (including brokers, finance companies, and nonfinan-
cial corporations) that are not subject to the same regulations. As the
yield on regulated bank assets, for example, falls relative to the returns
offered by the portfolios of competitors, the rate of return on equity of
lending--and to businesses themselves through outright guarantees (Chrysler and Lock-
heed) to income support programs (import quotas, tariffs, price supports).
~o If businesses are not indifferent about their financial structure (see footnote 3), then
controls that alter the relative supplies of different types of financing essentially increase
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banks tends to fall relative to that of other enterprises (Gurley and Shaw
1960). Consequently, to offer a competitive return on equity, either banks
must reduce their ratio of common stockholders’ capital to assets, or banks
must enter other lines of business. As economic conditions, computer
technology, and the regulations governing underwriters and brokerage
firms (such as the abolition of fixed commissions and the advent of shelf
registration) during the 1960s and the 1970s bred strong competition for
banks and insurance companies, the seigniorage that they received from
their charters became insufficient to maintain an adequate return on
common stockholders’ equity. Accordingly, these intermediaries explored
"financial innovations," and their ratios of capital to assets fell as they
attempted to sustain a competitive return on equity (table 4).
Besides explicitly insuring their liabilities, public policy might
attempt to bolster the rate of return on capital of regulated intermedi-
aries in several ways (Gurley and Shaw 1960). The government may
invest in the equities of these intermediaries, perhaps "nationalizing"
them: Farm Credit System, Federal Housing Finance Board, Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation, Student Loan Marketing Association, College Construction Loan
Insurance Association, Commodity Credit Corporation, Farmers Home
Administration, Export-Import Bank, Rural Electrification Administra-
tion, Foreign Military Sales, Small Business Administration, and Veter-
ans Administration. Through these agencies and enterprises as well as
through other means such as the tax codes, the government also may
guarantee or subsidize qualifying borrowers or creditors. Furthermore,
small and "inefficient" intermediaries could be combined into larger
enterprises, which might become more efficient, as is occurring in the
banking and thrift industries.
The capital and credit controls that apply to financial institutions are
numerous and often complex. Because the functions of intermediaries
are not always distinct and the interactions among intermediaries and
financial markets are extensive, the regulations that govern each inter-
mediary or financial market also may influence others. With these
explicit controls, tax laws and general security or trust laws also
influence the financial policies of intermediaries.
Before the 1930s, many banks both held and underwrote a variety of
securities, including stocks and bonds, in order to supply the capital
financing required by growing industries. To the degree banks bridged
savers’ fundamental lack of information about investors, critics believed
that allowing banks to offer securities to the public created a consider-
able moral hazard (Carosso 1970). During the 1930s, these long-standing
concerns about conflicts of interest and insider information yielded
federal legislation separating commercial and investment banking. Re-
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development, many domestic banks have emerged as investment banks
abroad. Many also have resumed merchant or investment banking at
home through their activities as dealers in credit market instruments or
in offering municipal securities, loan syndications, participations, nego-
tiable certificates of deposit, and, recently, commercial paper or corpo-
rate bonds. Although banks generally can hold only minimal equity,
creative arrangements like small business financing, yield enhance-
ments, warrants, options, participations, and the development of ven-
ture capital affiliates allow banks somewhat more latitude (Saulsbury
1987, U.S. Congress 1987-1988). The attraction of investment banking
and equity participations has only increased with the recent adoption of
more stringent capital requirements for banks which, by the early 1990s,
may restore their capitalization to levels resembling those of the 1950s
and 1960s (table 4).
Early in this century, most life insurance companies were prohib-
ited by the State of New York from holding common stocks or under-
writing securities (Carosso 1970, Jones 1968). During the early 1960s,
new regulations permitted the creation of separate accounts in which life
insurance companies could hold modest amounts of equity in order to
better compete with other institutional investors for the rapidly growing
pension and annuity business. Insurers also acquired some real estate,
securities with "equity kickers," and other assets that offered some of
the characteristics of an equity interest. Recognizing that a portfolio
comprising risky assets need not be very risky itself, the most recent
revisions of insurance regulations give insurers much more latitude to
acquire equity. Due partly to competitive pressures, the ratio of capital
to assets for insurers, like that of banks, fell during the past three
decades. Moreover, for mutual insurance companies especially, regula-
tions often specified ceilings for surplus accounts in order to prevent
these companies from withholding an excessive proportion of their
earnings from their owners (policyholders).
Pension plans comprise a variety of financial arrangements, which
include annuities, employer-sponsored thrift accounts, deferred com-
pensation plans, and individual retirement plans, funded with assets
managed by investment advisors, trust companies, insurance compa-
nies, or banks (McGill and Grubbs 1989). Pension fund sponsors have
placed a significant proportion of their assets in equities, a proportion
that increased greatly during the 1960s and early 1970s (table 4).11 To the
extent this allocation of assets depends on the relative yields of debt and
u Since 1974, equity’s share of private pension assets has fallen more than 10
percentage points; over the same interval, its share of state and local retirement funds has
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equity, the comparatively attractive real interest rates now available to
untaxed pension funds may diminish equity’s appeal (Black and Dew-
hurst 1981; Tepper 1981; Friedman 1985). The potential appeal of debt
may be even greater if federal regulations, accounting standards, and
the interests of sponsors tend to foster immunization strategies--
running a matched book wherein the duration of accumulated liabilities
essentially equals that of assets (Bodie 1989; Black 1989).
Financial intermediaries may not fulfill their potential for efficiently
transferring resources from savers to investors when they hold negligi-
ble equity in enterprises that are unfamiliar to savers. Not all informa-
tion about an investment project receives the same attention from a
creditor who has no equity interest. Furthermore, "bankers" who are no
more than creditors are less likely to enjoy the full confidence of
investors whenever the interests of owners conflict with those of
creditors. The efficient transfer of resources also is promoted relatively
little by intermediaries that acquire the equities of large, familiar
corporations (as prudence, contractual responsibilities, and practical
management seem to require of many pension funds or trusts). In place
of financial intermediaries, the nonfinancial corporations that enjoy a
relatively low cost of capital become a source of equity financing for
those investors who are less familiar to savers.
Market Discipline
One tactic for reducing the risks inherent in intermediation would
shift some of these risks onto the customers or creditors of financial
intermediaries. An extreme version of this tactic would tie the returns on
indirect securities more closely to those on the assets held by interme-
diaries. Insured deposits and annuities, for example, might be offered
only by intermediaries that acquire securities either written or guaran-
teed by the federal government.12 Another version would require
intermediaries to finance some proportion of their assets with short-
term subordinated debt. Accordingly, the fear of losing customers or
paying creditors penalty rates would discipline intermediaries. A more
promising approach, however, would mandate relatively high mini-
12 With such insured institutions, the government essentially becomes the financial
intermediary by bearing the responsibility for the making of loans financed either with
government securities or its guarantees. If insured banks, for example, also may acquire
some assets other than those bearing the explicit guarantee of the government, then a
"social contract" (featuring a "put" written by the government to these banks as
designated agents) tends to bestow an implicit guarantee on the value of these qualifying
assets, unless perhaps they are of small consequence in the portfolios of these banks.192 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
mum capital requirements to be financed entirely by the holders of
common stock.
Intermediaries, like other enterprises, exist because they represent
the most economical means of bridging differences between savers and
investors (Coase 1937). Accordingly, outsiders may not be capable of
accurately auditing intermediaries at a reasonable cost (Randall 1989,
pp. 10--13; Avery, Belton, and Goldberg 1988; Berger, Kuester, and
O’Brien 1989). In the extreme version of this approach, establishing
mutual funds, savers might find little common ground with investors.
The less extreme version, mandating subordinated debt, may only
reshape agency costs rather than reduce them. When an intermediary is
under duress, the interests of subordinated creditors may coincide with
those of equityholders; witness the behavior of the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and
the government during the 1970s and 1980s with regard to failing
savings and loan associations. When the assessment of outside creditors
is more pessimistic than that of the better informed managers of
intermediaries, the process of intermediation can become less efficient;
the reduction in agency costs may not offset the greater cost of capital
imposed by outside creditors.
In any case, market discipline need not reduce the costs imposed by
the threat of runs or by winner’s curses. To the degree outsiders are
more susceptible to fads than insiders, oversight by outsiders could
increase these risks. For example, pension fund managers subject to
quarterly reviews by their plans’ sponsors are criticized for their undue
attention to short-run performance, their "herd instincts," and their
inclinations toward "window dressing." Similar criticisms are applied to
banks that also seek favorable ratings from the securities community.
"Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conven-
tionally than to succeed unconventionally" (Keynes 1936, p. 158).
Though checks and balances are a cornerstone of our society, perhaps
the hand of public opinion already rests sufficiently heavily on many of
our intermediaries.
Instead of asking outsiders to discipline intermediaries, regulations
may encourage insiders to do so. Relatively high minimum capital
requirements to be financed entirely by common stockholders (residual
claimants) rather than creditors (including preferred stockholders) may
diminish agency costs. If the intermediary is to be "sold" to others when
its capital requirements are not satisfied, then the owners and managers
of the intermediary bear more of.the burden of risk-taking. Accordingly,
intermediaries tend to make a more balanced assessment of the pro-
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Regulation and Economic Stability
We have described the way in which regulations influence the flow
of funds from savers to investors. But, do these regulations make
financial intermediation more secure? Do more secure intermediaries
promote a more stable economy? Do these goals conflict? Our current
regulatory structure reflects how these goals were weighed in the
aftermath of the Great Depression. FDIC Chairman Seidman described
the rationale for the Glass-Steagall Act which restricts banking activities
as follows:13
First and foremost, it [the Glass-Steagall Act] would help protect and
maintain the financial stability of the commercial banking system, and would
strengthen public confidence in commercial banks . . . Finally, the assumed
potential for bank securities operations to exaggerate financial and business
fluctuations and undermine the economic stability of the country by chan-
neling bank deposits into "speculative" securities activities would be elimi-
nated.
Both the domestic and international financial market conditions have
changed substantially since 1933, raising questions as to whether
current regulations, not only Glass-Steagall but also deposit insurance
and capital requirements, appropriately weigh the goal of making
intermediaries more secure against the goal of fostering a more stable
economy.
The Model
To understand the role of regulation in promoting secure interme-
diation, we start with a simplified model of an intermediary in the
absence of regulation. The model can be summarized in three equations
that describe the intermediary’s return on assets, the return to stock-
holders, and the utility of stockholders.14
13 This quote is part of the testimony that L. William Seidman, chairman of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, presented to the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce. Chairman Seidman, as well as the Comptroller of the Currency, the chairman
of the Federal Reserve, and the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, all
argued that banking activities needed to be extended beyond what was permitted in the
Glass-Steagall Act (U.S. Congress 1987-1988).
14 This model does not take into account the opportunity cost (in terms of risk or
returns) of stockholders’ investment in the intermediary. Consequently, it is not a
"general equilibrium" model. Nevertheless, for the experiments considered in this paper
(the changing of regulations) the model’s qualitative conclusions, in most circumstances,
coincide with those of more complete models.194 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
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The first equation describes the return on assets, which declines as
assets increase. This equation models a declining marginal efficiency of
capital. For example, a bank wishing to substantially increase its loan
portfolio will have difficulty maintaining the same quality of loans,
resulting in loans with a lower expected return or a higher variance. The
current problem loans to developing countries partly reflect the diffi-
culty banks had maintaining their loan opportunities during their rapid
growth in the 1970s.
The second equation describes the return to shareholders due to
leveraging. Because of leverage, the mean return to shareholders, Ur,
and the variance of the return to shareholders, vr, are greater than the
mean and variance of the return on assets. The relationship between the
interest rate on debt (i) and leverage is shown in figure 1 and described
more fully in the appendix. Even at very low levels of leverage, the
interest rate on debt is above the risk-free rate, if, since the probability
that losses will be so great that the debt cannot be paid off is low, but
positive. As leverage increases, so do the probability of default and the
interest rate. For any given leverage, increases in A or vr~, or decreases
in ug increase the rate of interest because the probability of default
increases.
Shareholders choose A and L to maximize their utility, as described
in equation (3). Shareholders are risk averse; they prefer higher returns
but lower risks. The utility of shareholders increases with their wealth
[(1 - L)A].
Equilibrium levels of risk and return are shown in figure 2 where
the shareholders’ marginal utility equals the marginal return. For a




from greater leverage exceeds the increase in the interest rate. Eventu-
ally debt holders require such a large premium that any further increase
in leverage decreases the expected return. If shareholders only maxi-
mized return, leverage would increase until the advantages of debt-
financed investment (uR - i) just equaled the cost of the additional debt
(i’Ll1 - L]). With risk-averse shareholders, leverage will be lower than
for risk-neutral stockholders because vr increases with leverage.
The objective of regulators is to ensure a secure intermediary, either
by providing guarantees to customers (for example, deposit insurance)
or by minimizing the probability of default by reducing vr (for example,
by capital requirements and asset restrictions). Since regulators and
shareholders have different goals, conflicts will occur when sharehold-
ers wish to assume more risk than regulators are willing to accept.
Deposit Insurance
The conflict between shareholder utility maximization and the goal
of achieving secure intermediaries is most apparent with deposit insur-
ance. By eliminating the risks of financial loss for customers, the cost of
borrowed funds does not depend on the risk borne by the institutions.










risk-free rate, since in the event of a default, the insurer rather than the
intermediary’s assets pays the customer. With the interest rate penalty
for taking additional risk eliminated, shareholders can increase their
return by increasing leverage.
The right panel of figure 3 shows that deposit insurance results in a
higher return for any given stock of assets, because no risk premium is
required on the borrowed funds. Shareholders are better off, since they
are on a higher indifference curve. If shareholders only maximized
return, the firm would take full advantage of debt financing and increase
its assets until uR = i. Insurance does not foster higher leverage if the
insurance premiums are fully risk-adjusted. With appropriately priced
insurance, the insurer behaves as a creditor in an unregulated market.
Thus, while depositors would require no premium, the risk premium on
the insurance would cause the intermediary to assume the same
leverage as it would without deposit insurance.
Capital Requirements
Deposit insurance encourages intermediaries to take greater risks,
which regulators try to offset with capital regulations and asset restric-
tions. By raising capital requirements, regulators may increase theREGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 197
Figure 4
amount of equity at risk before creditors (or the insurer) lose money, and
reduce the variance of shareholder returns. Once leverage is set by the
regulator, the only choice remaining for shareholders is to pick the
optimal size of the intermediary. Figure 4 shows that imposition of
capital requirements causes the firm to move down its return line from
A to B. The lower expected return to shareholders as a result of higher
leverage can be partially offset by reducing assets.
Greater capital requirements reduce the variance of shareholders’
returns along with their average returns. Consequently, shareholders
would prefer to acquire riskier assets if they promised shareholders a
higher return.15 If we adjusted the model to allow shareholders to
choose the risk and return of assets, us becomes a function of vs. In
response to higher capital requirements, which lower ur and Vr, share-
holders could choose riskier assets with higher expected returns. De-
pending on how sensitive us is to vs, the variance of equity may be
greater with capital requirements than without.
~ It is possible that rational shareholders will invest in a project with higher vR and
lower uR, if the value of equity is very low or negative. This will occur because with
negative net worth all the potential loss is paid by the debtholder or insurer, while




Asset restrictions require intermediaries to invest in assets viewed
as "’safe" by regulators. Banks, for example, generally cannot hold
equity.16 Figure 5 shows the possible returns accruing to an investment.
The upper tail represents the returns to equity holders. If the project
pays less than A, creditors get partial payment and shareholders receive
nothing. The expected return of the project, m, includes the whole
distribution. While the probability that the stake is valueless is much
lower for debt holders than for shareholders, by not participating in the
upper tail, creditors must receive a return less than m. The requirement
that banks hold only debt reduces their expected rate of return. The
lower uR increases the probability of default, causing shareholders to
reduce leverage and asset size.
Asset restrictions ideally would reduce VR; however, this result is
virtually impossible to achieve. Undertaking credit or interest rate risk
does not require exotic financial instruments. Interest rate risk can be
achieved with government bonds, and the worst credit risks may be
local business loans. Even these sources of risk cannot be effectively
monitored by examiners, since interest risks can change in a few
16 In countries such as Germany, banks are allowed to hold equity. McCauley and
Zimmer (1989) find that close relations between banks and corporations can reduce the
costs and the probability of bankruptcy.REGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 199
Figure 6
minutes and some credit risks are difficult to determine even after
extensive interviews and documentation.
If asset restrictions could sucessfully reduce vR, they still might not
reduce Yr. Figure 6 illustrates the effect of asset restrictions when UR is a
function of VR. Unlike the previous figures, the slope of the return line
is determined by increasing VR rather than leverage. The return line
increases at an increasing rate as shareholders must make increasingly
risky investments to increase the average return. Any change in assets
or leverage shifts the return line. If regulators required less risky assets,
movement from A to B, both the mean and the variance of shareholder
returns would drop. In response, shareholders could increase assets or
leverage.
Regulatory Choices
Table 7 summarizes the effects of different regulatory choices.
Deposit insurance unaccompanied by other regulation eliminates risk
for depositors but makes the intermediary less secure, since sharehold-
ers have an incentive to expand and to increase leverage. The costs of
regulation by insurance fall upon the government. The government
subsidizes the insurance by i - iF - the deposit insurance premium.
Increases in risk, caused by greater leverage and expansion of assets,
increase the size of the subsidy. If capital regulation is not enforced, the200 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
Table 7
Effects of Regulatory Choices
Effect on
Shareholder Cost to
Regulation Leverage Asset Size Utility Government
Insurance + + + +
Capital Requirements - - - 0
Equity Restrictions - - - +
Asset Restrictions + + - 0
probability of default can rise rapidly, as it did for the savings and loan
industry during the early 1980s, and if other intermediaries are covered
by implicit insurance, the government subsidy to these intermediaries is
greater than that to the banking industry.
Unlike deposit insurance, capital requirements decrease leverage,
the growth of assets, and the utility of the shareholder. Capital require-
ments are used frequently to regulate intermediaries because they
reduce leverage without any cost to the government, other than admin-
istrative expenses. While intermediaries can substitute asset risk for
leverage risk, substantial equity stakes avoid the incentive for risk-
taking that occurs when only debtholders or insurers bear the cost of
unsuccessful investments.
Equity restrictions require no expenditure of government funds but
do little to reduce the assumption of risk by intermediaries. Such
restrictions do not increase the stability of the intermediary since equity
positions in well-capitalized stable enterprises may be less risky than
loans to highly leveraged risky enterprises. Furthermore, restrictions
may increase the risk of corporate failure, both because intermediaries
may too quickly abandon potentially profitable projects and because
intermediaries encourage debt as a source of funds for firms whose
financing needs might be better accommodated with equity.
By not changing regulations with changing economic conditions,
the regulator is, in effect, choosing a different regulatory mix. Higher
and more variable interest rates in an unchanged regulatory environ-
ment diminish the influence of asset restrictions and capital require-
ments while increasing the deposit insurance subsidy. Asset restrictions
are less confining because the variance of returns on assets often exceeds
that which was anticipated when asset restrictions were adopted.
Capital requirements based on book values of assets and liabilities
become less binding because the market value of equity falls even if its
book value is unchanged. In contrast, insurance is more valuable toREGULATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY 201
shareholders because the greater risk from higher leverage and more
variable asset returns is not reflected in the cost of funds.
In summary, while deposit insurance makes depositors more se-
cure, it may at the same time make intermediaries less secure and the
economy less stable. Insurance encourages intermediaries to take
greater risks, both by assuming greater leverage and by making riskier
loans (greater VR). To the degree savers are attracted to insured
depository institutions that are prevented from holding equity, current
regulations can make the economy less stable.
Conclusions
Financial intermediaries provide services to savers and investors by
bearing risks. By transforming the primary securities issued by investors
into assets that are attractive to savers, intermediaries reduce the
difference between the price savers ask for funds and the price investors
bid for funds. As long as intermediaries recognize the consequences of
the risks inherent in this mismatched book, their activities facilitate the
efficient flow of resources from savers to investors. But intermediaries
may impose unacceptable risks on the economy because of externalities,
agency costs, and competitive pressures.
Although government regulations attempt to manage the risks
inherent in financial intermediation, these regulations, by reshaping our
financial system, may increase the risks inherent in saving and invest-
ing. Deposit insurance combined with capital and credit controls, as
currently designed, fosters intermediation and the use of debt instead of
equity financing of investment. Savers have found insured indirect
securities more attractive than bonds and stocks. In turn, the assets of
financial intermediaries comprise loans, bonds, and, to a degree, the
stock of corporations already familiar to savers. Accordingly, the cost of
equity financing can be relatively great and volatile for less familiar
enterprises that must appeal directly to savers.
Deposit insurance without appropriate safeguards can be expensive
for the government. Although agency costs are present for any enter-
prise that finances its assets with debt, deposit insurance increases the
incentives for both intermediaries and firms to assume greater risk and
leverage. Risk-based insurance premiums would eliminate many of
these incentives; however, the difficfilties in setting these premiums are
formidable. Instead, regulators impose asset restrictions and capital
requirements on financial intermediaries in order to control their as-
sumption of risk.
The reliance on debt financing promoted by existing asset restric-
tions divides the interests of investors from those of intermediaries,202 Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren
thereby impeding an efficient flow of information to those financing
investments and encouraging intermediaries, as creditors, to "fore-
close" prematurely on "disappointing" projects. Asset restrictions also
discourage intermediaries from investing in risky but potentially profit-
able projects that are not suited to debt financing. In this way, regulation
may increase economic instability. If banks could assume an equity
interest, a less partial assessment of the future value of investments
could make the supply of funds to investors more ample and more
dependable.
Aside from imparting a creditor’s bias to intermediation, tending to
make the economy less stable, capital and credit controls do not
necessarily make intermediaries more secure. If intermediaries exist
because of their ability to process information and evaluate prospective
returns, outside regulators may increase rather than reduce risk to the
degree they influence intermediaries’ asset allocations. Binding capital
and credit controls, which diminish an intermediary’s ret~arn on equity,
encourage regulated institutions to assume risks that regulators neither
observe nor control. Furthermore, controls that limit the diversification
of an intermediary’s portfolio may make it less secure. In this respect,
regulations governing life insurance companies, which weigh the risk of
entire portfolios, are preferable to banking regulations which weigh the
risk of specific assets. Regulators also may enhance risk unintentionally
by comparing individual intermediaries to industry averages and en-
couraging greater conformity among institutions. From a social point of
view, diversity among as well as within intermediaries may promise the
greatest security.
Although intermediaries play an important role in economic devel-
opment, regulations that might make these institutions more secure do
not necessarily make the economy more stable. For example, deposit
insurance coupled with capital and credit controls increases savers’
reliance on the implicit guarantee of investors’ cash flows. A presump-
tion of financial stability by savers commits the government to ratify
asset prices and enforce investors’ expectations. During the past thirty
years, this "put" written by the government has been expanding. It is
not coincidental that the largest and fastest-growing intermediaries
(including the government and its sponsored enterprises) have been
those with explicit "deposit" insurance. Whenever prudent macroeco-
nomic policies cannot sustain the value of international, oil patch, real
estate, or farm loans, the subsequent financial collapse may be more
severe to the degree that savers, intermediaries, and investors have
come to rely on this presumed commitment.
The risks inherent in financial intermediation might be controlled
most efficiently by substantially relaxing asset restrictions and by adopt-
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maintain a competitive return on equity despite asset restrictions, by
reducing their ratios of capital to assets, the relaxation of asset restric-
tions can be exchanged for greater minimum capital ratios. If regulators
are able to transfer the ownership of intermediaries that fail to meet their
capital requirements when existing owners and managers still have a
substantial stake, the incentives for risk-taking by the institution will be
diminished. These capital requirements can be effective only if the
capital of intermediaries can be measured accurately. Failure to reprice
assets for changes in credit ratings and changes in interest rates
misrepresents shareholders’ stake in the intermediary. When the market
value of equity is unacceptably low and the book value of equity is
sufficiently great, rational shareholders should take greater risks, since
losses will be borne by creditors or insurers while shareholders receive
the gains.
Appendix
Figure 1 and Figure 3--The interest rate, i, compensates creditors for
the risk of bankruptcy, i will always exceed if, since there is always a
possibility that debt will not be paid off. This line is described in
equation (A.1):
f
L(1 + i) - 1
i - if = (i - R) pdf (R) dR (A.1)
J -00
di     di     di
-->0,     >0,     <0.
dL    ~v~
Shareholders choose assets and leverage to maximize utility. When
assets increase, the return line shifts up since uR falls and VR rises. The
greater the leverage, L, the higher the probability of bankruptcy, and the
more creditors must be compensated for the additional risk.
Deposit insurance eliminates creditor risk, so i = if.
Remaining figures--Shareholders choose leverage and assets to max-
imize utility.
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Deposit Insurance--As described above, deposit insurance severs the
link between the interest rate and leverage, so i’L = 0 and the interest
rate drops to the risk-free rate. Equilibrium is restored with higher
leverage and greater asset size.
Capital Requirements--L is no longer a choice variable. With binding
capital requirements L drops, causing equation (A.4) to be positive.
Equilibrium is restored with fewer assets.
Equity Restrictions--Firms hold only debt, causing uR to fall. Equa-
tion (A.3) becomes negative. Equilibrium is restored with lower leverage
and fewer assets.
Asset Restrictions--Firms maximize equation (A.2) with respect to VR
and the mean is a function of the variance:
0 -~ U1 q- U2 (1 L)2 (5)
If regulators require vR to drop, firms increase leverage and asset size.
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Ben S. Bernanke*
The title of the Kopcke-Rosengren paper fits in with the theme of the
conference but is slightly misleading. Little direct regulation of debt and
equity per se actually occurs; that is, few restrictions exist on the kinds of
financial contracts that could in principle be written. For the most part, the
effect of public policy on financial contracting is indirect, operating through
the tax code, the laws pertaining to corporate governance and bankruptcy,
and the regulation of financial intermediaries. It is this last channel of
policy--the regulation of financial intermediaries--on which the paper
actually focuses, and on which this comment will focus as well.
The paper falls naturally into two parts. The first section argues that
increasing reliance of household savers on intermediated assets, plus
regulations that induce intermediaries to hold mostly debt, have led to
a growing pro-debt bias in the economy. This is an interesting sugges-
tion; it affords a different perspective by looking at the behavior of
suppliers of funds in order to explain trends in leverage, rather than at
the behavior of demanders of funds (firms), as is more common.
Some evidence can be found that this change in the composition of
household wealth may have influenced very long-run trends in lever-
age. It is less clear, however, that savers’ preferences have played an
important role in the leverage trends of the past twenty years. Table 2 in
the Kopcke-Rosengren paper shows that, as a share of financial assets,
deposits have been stable since 1970-74; all of the growth among
*Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University. Visiting Professor,
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Visiting Scholar,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1989-90.208 Ben S. Bernanl~e
indirect securities since that time has been concentrated in pension fund
reserves. Unlike banks, of course, pension funds do not face direct
restrictions on holding equity and indeed hold a larger share of assets as
equity than do households.1 This observation, plus the fact that greater
amounts of government debt are competing with corporate debt for a
place in wealth-holders’ portfolios, makes it hard to argue that the
relative supplies to corporations of debt and equity finance have recently
shifted toward debt. Further, as Kopcke and Rosengren themselves
point out, historically the composition of firms’ external finance has not
been sensitive to changes in the sources of funds. Thus it still seems
likely that leverage trends in the 1980s have more to do with the
decisions of firms than with the decisions of savers.
On the other hand, the failure of households to hold a larger share
of wealth as equities, despite the stock market boom of the past seven
years, is surprising. The decline in the relative share of noncorporate
equities could be explained as a data problem, reflecting the difficulty of
measuring the market values of non-traded stock, but of course this
does not apply to corporate equities.
The second main part of the paper, comprised of the second and
third sections, discusses the economics of financial intermediary regu-
lation. Any serious discussion of this issue immediately raises two basic
questions: (1) Why are intermediaries regulated in the first place? (2) If
we accept that regulation of intermediaries is desirable, what are the
optimal regulatory instruments? The paper emphasizes the strengths
and weaknesses of specific regulatory instruments but does not, I think,
give enough attention to the first, logically prior question.
The intellectual basis for intermediary regulation is in fact some-
what shaky. Kopcke and Rosengren write, "Because of agency costs,
externalities, and competitive pressures, financial transactions may
impose unacceptable risks on the economy without offering adequate
compensation.’" This statement is not wrong, as I will discuss, but it
glosses over some difficult issues. As a theoretical matter, the existence
of agency costs, which are endemic to many parts of the economy
besides financial markets, does not in general justify government
intervention; and in practice, attempts to regulate industries with high
agency costs can be counterproductive, as anyone who buys auto
insurance knows. "Competitive pressures" is a strange argument for
regulation; usually we think that markets work better when there is
competition.. Probably what the authors are thinking of here is the
interaction of competitive pressures with existing perverse regulations,
1 This is true despite the incentive, noted by Bodie at this conference, for defined
benefit plans to hold debt to hedge their obligations.DISCUSSION 209
such as asset restrictions. What is meant by "’externalities" is not spec-
ified, but I think there is something to this, as I will discuss in a moment.
Historically, of course, much of our current financial regulatory
structure arose as a response to the collapse of banking and financial
markets in the Great Depression. The measures taken in the New Deal
did help to end the crisis and to prevent major financial problems over
the ensuing half-century. Thus the 1930s-era regulations, particularly
deposit insurance, have long been hailed as a major policy success.
Nevertheless, the historical record does not unambiguously support
regulatory intervention in financial markets, and a revisionist view has
lately become popular among some financial historians. These histori-
ans have argued that, prior to the Great Depression, largely unregulated
financial systems in both the United States and other countries per-
formed well and contributed substantially to economic growth and
development. True, the United States had periodic financial panics; but
(the argument goes) the damage caused by these was controlled by
suspension of convertibility, clearinghouse oversight, and other private
mechanisms. The specific problems of the Great Depression were caused,
in this view, by inept regulatory intervention: unit banking laws, which
kept banks small and vulnerable; the suppression of the clearinghouses;
and the mistakes of the Federal Reserve.
Given the lack of a well-articulated theoretical rationale for inter-
mediary regulation and the ambiguous verdict of history, is there any
basis for government intervention in financial markets? If there is one, !
think it must be based on something like the following logic:
(2)
The performance of financial intermediaries, like that of many
firms, is strongly affected by their financial condition. Interme-
diaries in financial distress, that is, with low or negative net
worth, have incentives to take socially undesirable actions, such
as making excessively risky investments. (This seemed clearly to
be the case with the S&Ls.)
Because the various components of the financial system are so
closely interconnected, and because finance plays a particularly
central role in the organization and functioning of a capitalist
economy, a widespread malfunctioning of the financial system
would pose unacceptable costs not only to the institutions and
those directly contracting with them, but to the economy at large.
Possible sources of externalities arising from financial failure in-
clude the closing of important financial markets (which might
occur if important dealers or the clearinghouse failed); loss of
liquidity and market-making capacity in markets that remain open;
the destruction of unique information capital, implying cutoffs of
credit to third parties; and aggregate demand externalities.210 Ben S. Bernanke
(3) Because of these costs to the economy at large, ex post the
government would have no alternative but to "bail out" that is,
transfer wealth to---the financial system if large institutions got
into trouble. This is the "put" on the government that Kopcke and
Rosengren refer to; it can also be thought of as a "time consisten-
cy" problem, arising because the government cannot effectively
commit in advance not to bail out those in trouble. By the way, as
Brimmer (1989) discusses, this "put" on the government now
appears to be held not only by large banks but also by other
financial markets and institutions, such as the commercial paper
market, the exchanges, and the clearing and settlement systems.
(4) Because of the external effects and the involuntary insurance
provided by the government to financial institutions, financial
arrangements drawn up ex ante and the risks taken by financial
decision-makers do not fully take into account downside risks.
This provides a rationale for some ex ante controls and moni-
toring by the government.
If we accept the view that some scope exists for regulation, then we
arrive at the second question, what tools should be used to regulate
financial institutions. Here I agree with Kopcke and Rosengren’s diag-
nosis: Put as succinctly as possible, "Capital requirements good, asset
restrictions bad." This follows directly from a basic principle of agency
theory, that in situations of pervasive asymmetric information, the
principal is better off setting the agent’s incentives in a way that makes
him internalize the effects of his own actions, rather than trying to
control the agent’s actions directly. Asset restrictions are an attempt to
control actions, which is usually futile or even counterproductive when
the financial institution has more information about its opportunities
than the regulator. As the paper notes, even when asset restrictions
succeed in modifying individual institutions’ behavior, they can have
perverse general equilibrium effects, for example, by increasing econo-
mywide leverage or by reducing industry diversity. Capital require-
ments are an imperfect tool, but a well-capitalized institution is more
likely to internalize the full costs and benefits of its decisions and thus
make good choices (from the social point of view).
The third major element of public policy with respect to intermediaries
is deposit insurance. The authors correctly point out the intrinsic problems
with government insurance of risky and illiquid investments. Deposit
insurance would work better with strong capital requirements, but I think
the best solution is to phase out deposit insurance of risk-taking institu-
tions. An alternative model which deserves serious consideration is Robert
Litan’s (1987) "narrow banking" idea. Litan’s suggestion is that banks that
wish to take insured deposits would have to back them only with extremelyDISCUSSION 211
safe assets, such as government securities. Uninsured banks would face no
asset restrictions, but presumably would finance themselves mostly by
equity or long-term debt rather than deposits. This would alleviate the
need for government oversight of information-intensive investment, at the
same time that it protects the money supply. For reasons discussed above,
though, it might still be necessary to impose capital requirements on
uninsured banks.
I will close with a few comments on the formal model of an
intermediary included in the last section of the paper. I was not
completely happy with this formalization. Here are my complaints:
(1) As specified, the only choice variable of the managers or share-
holders is A, the quantity of assets. Since the choice of total assets
is presumably observable by lenders, strictly speaking no agency
problem exists in the model. A fully efficient financial contract can
be written, that is, one that leads to the socially optimal level of
assets. The contract could be thought of as a loan with an interest
rate that depends on the level of assets and an expected return
equal to the opportunity cost of funds in the economy.
(2) The expression for the return to shareholders is not truncated at
-100 percent return. Implicitly, equation (2) assumes that
shareholders are always required (and able) to pay off the loan.
If this were so, the loan would pay the risk-free rate.
(3) The expression for shareholder utility does not make sense to
me. A (1 - L)--do the authors mean A - L?--is not the
shareholders’ wealth but the portion of their wealth that they
contribute to bank capital. Utility should depend on the mean
and variance of the shareholders’ entire portfolios, not just on
the part invested in the bank.
(4) How is the "bank" modelled in this section different from any
corporation borrowing funds? and (even if there are deadweight
losses due to agency costs) where are the external effects of the
financial contract that would motivate regulation? This is an
unfair question, since I am not sure, either, how to model the
"special" features of intermediaries or the possible externalities
associated with intermediary failure. But that is the direction in
which research should go.
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Albert M. Wojnilower*
Richard Kopcke and Eric Rosengren have submitted a most
thoughtful appraisal of the role of financial intermediaries and regula-
tors in the corporate debt surge. Like all economists, the authors are well
aware how difficult it can be to regulate effectively and how unpredict-
able and undesirable may be the side effects. While sympathizing with
their misgivings, let me confess up front that I do not share our
profession’s indiscriminate objections to regulation. As the savings and
loan crisis illustrates, delay in making awkward choices among regula-
tory alternatives can lead to even more unpleasant predicaments in
which no choice is left at all as to the nature and scope of intervention.
The Shrinking of Corporate Equity: What’s Good for
Each Is Not Good for All
The hybridization of debt and equity that has been the theme of this
conference performs a most useful economic function. The financial
changes taking place in many companies are the proper response to the
prevailing global winds. The problem is that, from the standpoint of the
economy as a whole, the process is bound to be overdone. The
incentives are so overpowering that issuers and investors alike are
driven to make ever more optimistic assumptions as to the govern-
ment’s ability to cope with shocks and to avert interest rate increases
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and/or recessions. Competition is forcing corporate officials increasingly
to take for granted that a free insurance policy written by the political
process must indemnify them for industrywide or economywide prob-
lems. A serious systemic risk is being embedded, from which the
economy urgently needs protection. With what I believe to be the
authors’ permission, I will comment only briefly on their paper and use
the rest of my time to argue a rather nonintrusive form of capital
requirements for non financial corporations that avoids throwing out the
baby with the bathwater.
Before tackling that subject, let me enter a few reservations as to the
authors’ treatment of the financial intermediary sector. They might have
sharpened their discussion by drawing a clearer line between depository
and other intermediaries. Mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies can and do acquire equity positions in various forms. To the
extent the public seeks the risks and rewards of equity ownership, it has
ample opportunity to do so directly or through these intermediaries. No
need exists for additional conduits. Whether banks are to have sepa-
rately capitalized mutual fund subsidiaries, which is what the authors
seem to suggest, is a peripheral issue. So, too, is whether the equity
investments in question happen to be new or are acquired in the
secondary market. The phenomenon that has spawned this conference
is not lack of capital for new ventures, but rather the extinguishment of
old equity and its replacement by new instruments that have debt
characteristics. Equity securities are being retired at upwards of $75
billion per year, largely using the proceeds of new debt.
The reason that banks and thrifts, in contrast to the other interme-
diaries, are severely restricted with respect to equity investment is that
they are entangled with the national monetary and payments machinery
and their deposits are federally insured. Do we really want banks to own
more equity securities? Would that have been helpful in avoiding or
coping with October 19, 1987? And would we have wanted banks and
other intermediaries marked to market and held to account that night?
That is what we did in the 1930s with respect to loan valuations, thereby
gravely deepening the Great Depression. From this, we learned not to
close down the whole banking system during the 1950s, even though
most banks sank under water because of the depreciation of the
low-coupon Treasury obligations bought to finance World War II. No,
there are some investments that "nice" banks, those with insured
deposits, simply cannot be permitted to make. For that abstinence,
however, they deserve to be esteemed, protected, and --modestly--
rewarded.
Kopcke and Rosengren’s discussion has the flavor that we might be
better off sharply limiting or even withdrawing deposit insurance and
the other aspects of the financial safety net. In the remote eventuality214 Albert M. Wojnilower
this actually became feasible, what would be the practical consequence?
Most of us would then invest much more heavily in government
securities, the only "insured" instrument left. This would so reduce the
government’s cost of funds compared with the private sector that the
socialization of investment would become politically irresistible. No
solace here for libertarians.
Why Is Equity Being Retired?
The rise in corporate debt ratios during the 1980s reflects the
confluence of many factors. First and foremost, in my judgment, is the
great intensification of international industrial integration, competition,
and specialization, which necessitates the profound redeployment of
our capital stock. We have entered a world in which every developed
country has to become more specialized in its production--and in which
the market for this output is worldwide. To compete, a tradable product
must be able to attract a significant share of the world market. A country
can achieve this only for a limited number of products. Small countries
have always known this. For the United States, however, which because
of two oceans and two World Wars has been used to producing almost
everything primarily at home, the narrowing of industrial focus is novel
and painful. It is compelling the restructuring, or worse, of many major
industries and enterprises.
Chronic losses, erosion of equity, and eventual bankruptcy would
have been the traditional means of adjustment. Debt-financed takeovers
and buyouts are smoother and faster. They are an effective way to
"bribe" normally recalcitrant top managements and shareholders to
accept prompt retrenchment, as well as to enable them to override the
opposition of middle management, unions, and other workers.
Furthering the process is the tide of funds seeking investment
opportunities in the United States. This partly reflects the generous
monetary policies of the major powers. Just as important, however, is
the fact that the world’s government as well as private investors prefer,
for a multitude of good reasons ranging from distrust of their govern-
ments to fear of earthquakes, to invest here. In principle the situation
parallels the 1970s, when the OPEC countries flooded the world with
investible funds. Then the less developed countries soaked up the
overflow. Today’s oversupply of funds is spurring the refinancing of the
United States.
Why is the process so debt-oriented? Part of the answer is provided
by the tax subsidy for debt. The typical company can save taxes by
converting dividend payments into interest. Although this incentive is
of long standing, the more competitive business environment andDISCUSSION 215
cheaper financial technology are causing it to be exploited more inten-
sively.
While a good deal of the new financing looks like debt, it still smells
and tastes like equity. The prices of the securities vary with the fortunes
of the issuing companies rather than with the general level of interest
rates. The high rates that are stipulated resemble the prevailing rate of
return on capital rather than the yield on high-grade debt. Sophisticated
investors cannot help but be aware that such returns must be at least as
uncertain and interruptible as those on stocks. (Unfortunately $40 billion
or so in "junk" bonds may have been sold, mainly through mutual
funds, to individuals, most of whom probably believe that consumer
protection entitles them to a free lunch.) At bottom, junk bonds and
loans are just equity camouflaged to deceive the Internal Revenue
Service.
Why Any Equity?
Not so long ago, when the Great Depression of the 1930s was still
a living memory, and when capital gains were taxed much more lightly
than dividend income, some businessmen would go so far as to assert
that no company could ever have "too much" equity or too little debt.
The sturdier the equity and the smaller the debt, the better able the
company was to withstand specific adversity or general hard times. The
equity base provided reliable protection for that network of explicit and
implicit contracts among shareholders, creditors, management, employ-
ees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large that defines each
corporate identity. Deep equity was needed to enable a company to take
substantial and long-range risks in investment and innovation.
Today, however, it is taken for granted that government can and
will prevent serious recessions. Capital gains no longer enjoy strongly
preferential tax treatment. Thus the justifications for hefty equity
cushions have lapsed. The apparent capital need is palpably smaller.
The potential is also greater for the squandering of capital that has been
rendered "surplus" by the change in attitudes.
Capital is perceived as needed only for riding out specific and
temporary adversity. As already indicated, however, much of the ad-
versity lately experienced by American business and likely for the future
stems from unforeseen sources of international competition that are
long-lived and intractable. Traditional companies are especially at risk,
particularly if their managements are strongly committed to traditional
ways. The market’s bias should be and is against taking long-term risks
and in favor of forcing companies to shake up management and divest216 Albert M. Wojnilower
unprofitable lines promptly. This is what high equity ratios delay--and
precisely what high debt ratios and interest burdens speed up.
Putting it more harshly, in a world thought to be depression-proof,
a fat equity cushion may foster incompetent or self-serving manage-
ment. The benefits that such managerial "agents" draw at the expense
of shareholders constitute another melon, in addition to the tax melon,
to be carved up in debt-financed takeovers. The prices paid in such
takeovers suggest that the market, probably correctly, has perceived
both melons to be juicy.
Even a tightly run, profitable company must, in this environment,
increase its leverage. Unless it does so, it will be "cooked in its own fat"
by acquirers who can use the "victimls’’ own unused borrowing capacity
to fund a takeover bid. The market is forcing companies to live closer to
the competitive edge.
Although in accord with the current state of the world, this change
is not an unmitigated social boon. It compels firms to take shorter-range
and narrower views of their function. An ample equity cushion confers
advantages similar to those enjoyed by a monopoly. It is what has
enabled companies to sponsor pure research with no visible commercial
payoff, to furnish executive talent to philanthropies, or to become
prominent donors to civic enterprises and universities. As the equity
cushion is jettisoned, these voluntary activities--President Bush’s
"thousand points of light"--fade away.
The configuration of interests and incentives that promotes the
"de-equitization" is so powerful that I see no timely self-limiting aspect.
Existing public and management shareholders get bought out at bo-
nanza prices. Old management may also benefit from "golden para-
chutes" and the like. New management (sometimes the same individ-
uals) obtains control of a now heavily indebted company, but usually at
little financial risk to itself and with significant new equity entitlements.
The new management stands to lose caste in the executive compensa-
tion market should its efforts fail, but the potential loss is much smaller
than the equity rewards of success.
As for the creditors, they achieve a high-return outlet for their glut
of funds in a form preferable to pure equity. Absent default, realization
of the return does not depend on the debtor company’s willingness or
ability to declare dividends, nor on the stock market’s reliability in
embodying revenue growth or prospects in a higher stock price. The
heavy debt intentionally pressures the company to divest sizable chunks
of assets, because survival really does depend on paying off the most
burdensome debt long before its Stated due date. In this key respect,
such loans are far superior to the notorious loans that were made in
Latin America and Africa, which created incentive and opportunity for
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loans also may sink into default, but unless this happens very early on,
before any of the sizable servicing has had a chance to proceed, the
lender may not suffer severely. And should, perchance, the indebted
company prosper beyond expectations, many loan agreements are
structured to include equity "kickers" that enable lenders to share the
good fortune.
Needless to add, investment bankers, accountants, and attorneys
also have strong incentives to promote the process. And, to repeat, the
tax system subsidizes it. Short of some spectacular and unlikely disaster,
the de-emphasis of traditional equity is likely to become virtually
universal.
Why Worry?
If the social benefit is the elimination of corporate fraud, waste, and
inefficiency, while the cost is only the pruning of some research
laboratories, orchestras, or universities, why should we be concerned?
The reason is, as our experience with depository institutions teaches,
that pure equity plays a crucial macroeconomic role in preserving our
economic system. It enables businesses to endure an interval of general
adversity, whether stemming from shocks or restrictive policies. An
adequate equity position at the individual firm level is needed to buy for
the economy at large what it was originally intended to provide for
individual companies: the survival time to make unavoidable adjust-
ments.
The credit crunches that preceded the deregulation of the deposi-
tory intermediaries accomplished their disinflationary intent with only
minor structural damage, because the intermediaries and their clients
were threatened only with insolvency, not bankruptcy. Liquidity and
profitability briefly vanished, but because capital was strong the injury
was not mortal. Cash was low but capital was strong.
Although equity may no longer be useful from the standpoint of the
individual enterprise protected by a national safety net, it remains
essential collectively. As my distant cousin, Jack Hirshleifer, pointed out
in a very early work, it does not really make much sense for us
individually to build nuclear shelters, possibly not even if everyone else
did. But it would surely increase the society’s survival probability in the
event of nuclear attack if everyone had to do so.
The disappearance of equity is taking us into a potentially much
deeper "moral hazard" morass than did the Latin American loans or the
savings and loan excesses. Now that heavily indebted companies are
becoming typical, the risk is already serious that a shock, such as higher
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companies to form a critical political mass. As with the depository
institutions, it is conceivable that bad news about some firms may infect
others that are innocent. It is in any case always in the interest of weak
companies, in connivance with sensationalist media, to try to make their
troubles general because that improves the odds the public safety net
will be unfurled in their behalf. We should expect to see on TV students
barred from college classrooms or widows evicted from their homes
because of junk bond disappointments. The now familiar game of
chicken between the financial institutions and the government is
spreading toward the nonfinancial sector.
Let me be quick to underline that, just as for forty years or more
there never has been any serious likelihood that depositors in major
banks or thrifts would lose money, the danger of an actual cascade of
corporate defaults also is slight or nonexistent. Just as we have seen the
governmental rescue function extended to, among others, Lockheed,
Chrysler, New York City, the commercial paper market, government
security dealers, and most recently the stock market, so may we safely
assume that public support would be invoked for any important group
of corporate debtors in difficulty. The risk we run by tolerating the
attrition of equity is not primarily that of economic catastrophe but
rather one of massive governmental rescue operations that deeply
politicize the economy.
What Is To Be Done?
We need to formally establish the prevention of systemic failure as
an economic policy objective separate and distinct from other macroeco-
nomic goals. That means recognizing that a separate and additional
instrument of control is required. The combating of systemic threats
cannot be accomplished through monetary or fiscal policy without
compromising the other tasks we have set for those instruments.
Given current realities, the new tool has to be one that constrains
the borrowers rather than the lenders. Our financial intermediaries,
generally speaking, are already weakened by unhappy loans from the
past, by actual and potential competition from foreign institutions, and
by the rapid advance of securitization that bypasses them entirely. They
need more profit opportunities rather than fewer. Credit evaluation and
monitoring is probably the expertise in which they enjoy the greatest
comparative advantage over their competitors. Thus they would be
seriously injured by further restraints on their participation in the
burgeoning sector of business finance. Moreover, restricting domestic
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would hardly impede the trend, just divert it into less visible and
manageable channels.
It is directly on large corporations that mandatory capital standards
need to be imposed. Small firms would be exempt since they do not
contribute materially to the systemic problem. I have in mind a financial
ratio approach similar to that already applied by lenders and bond rating
agencies. The equity requirement should be gentle--I visualize less than
1 per cent of the regulated universe in initial violation but satisfiable
only by pure equity.
The role prescribed for these requirements is emphatically collective
rather than particular. The notion of capital as a form of "coinsurance"
that prompts owners to take early heed of an enterprise’s difficulties is
useful only when a firm suffers reverses peculiar to itself. When the
problems are macroeconomic and threaten many firms at the same time,
each firm’s effort to save itself merely worsens the general plight. The
object of equity regulation is to compel a buffer such that firms will be
"forced," as it were, to survive a general downturn on their own
resources, notwithstanding their inclination to become public welfare
cases. Of course, to avoid keeping the fire engine locked up while the
city burns, the authorities must be allowed to lower the requirements
when they see fit, but only across the board for macroeconomic reasons,
not for individual cases.
The required ratios would have to be set at different levels for
different firms, depending on their size and industry. It long has been
known that debt-equity and other financial ratios differ according to
industry and size of firm. (I was hardly the first to show this in my
antediluvian 1960 Ph.D. dissertation, done without benefit of computer
or even calculator. Kopcke has done it in sophisticated and elegant
fashion in a recent article in the New England Economic Review.) A certain
arbitrariness is unavoidable, but it would hardly be greater than that
already involved in the setting of bond ratings by the private rating
agencies. Accountants tell me that the IRS already applies such norms
to small corporations to avoid abuse of interest deductibility. For
large companies, the rating agencies routinely collect and assess the
relevant data. Thus mandatory capital standards would involve no great
departure from precedent or novelty in terms of reporting and enforce-
ment.
The twofold penalty for noncompliance would be simple and
automatic. The lesser penalty would be the withdrawal of the tax
advantage for the excess debt--the interest would be treated as though
it were dividends. This would limit the tax incentive for equity retire-
ment without radically revising the ecology of our tax system. But in
many cases this would not be an adequate deterrent. The more potent
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management, with forfeiture of equity entitlements, golden parachutes,
and the like.
The replacement of pure equity by instruments having prominent
debt attributes is helpful in the reorganization and toughening of our
economy. The incentive structure, however, is such that the process is
not adequately self-disciplining. It parallels our experience with depos-
itories and is breeding an even greater systemic risk. Monetary and fiscal
policy is inhibited. Farflung and politically damaging bailouts may
eventually be triggered.
An additional economic tool is needed for the separate task of
protecting the economy from such systemic risk. Equity capital require-
ments for larger corporations are proposed as a simple, effective, and
market-oriented device. Such requirements seem a rather nonintrusive
way to check a trend that, unconstrained, may lead to the backdoor
socialization of the economy.